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1. General features 
The Italian educational system can be featured as a rather underdeveloped one, 
in relation to the other major EU countries and most OECD countries, from a 
number of viewpoints. 
1.  Level of expenditure: The expenditure on educational institutions as a 
percentage of GDP has remained lower than that of the major EU countries and 
the OECD average (table 1). 
 
Table 1 
Expenditure on educational institutions as a percentage of Gdp, 
for all levels of education (% 1998, 2001, 2004) 
 
 
Private (excl. subsidies 
to households) 
Public (incl. subsidies 
to households)  Total 
   1998  2001 2004  1998 2001 2004  1998  2001  2004
France 0,4  0,6 0,4  5,9 5,4 5,7 6,2  6,0  6,1
Germany 1,2  1,0 0,9  4,4 4,3 4,3  5,6  5,3  5,2
Italy 0,2  0,4 0,5  4,8 4,9 4,4 5,0  5,3  4,9
Spain 0,9  0,6 0,6  4,4 4,3 4,2 5,3  4,9  4,7
United Kingdom  0,3  0,8 1,0 4,7 4,7 5,0 4,9  5,5  5,9
United States  1,6  2,1 2,3 4,8 5,3 5,1 6,4  7,3  7,4
EU19 average  n.a.  n.a. 0,5  n.a. n.a. 5,0 n.a.  n.a.  5,4
OECD average  0,7  0,7 0,7  5,0 5,0 5,0 5,7  5,6  5,7
OECD total  1,1  1,4 1,4  4,6 4,8 4,7  5,8  6,2  6,2
 
Source: OECD, 2007a: table B2.4. 
 
2. Educational expenditure per student: the fact that this is higher in Italy than the 
OECD average and major EU countries for the pre-primary, primary and lower 
secondary education (table 2) is not an indicator of a better situation. In fact, a 
possible explanation has to do with an inefficient organisation of education at 
these levels: in particular, at the primary level there are multiple teachers for each 4 
class of students, which does not respond to special needs (in particular, it can 
only partially be justified on the basis of the need of special care for disabled 
students) and does not lead to a better performance. By contrast, the expenditure 
per student is lower in Italy than in France, Germany and the US in higher 
secondary education. 
Data for tertiary education are misleading, because Italian private institutions 
are not included, and the effective attendance by students is low. Ratios change 
when part-time students are correctly considered
1: Perotti (2002) shows that 
Italian universities are better funded than British universities, as the expenditure 
per academic staff or per full-time equivalent student is higher in Italy. 
 
Table 2 
Annual expenditure on educational institutions per full-time equivalent student, 
by level of education (US $ PPP, 2004) 
 
 Pre-primary 
(3 years and 
older) 







type A and 
advanced 
France 4,938  5,082  7,837 9,883 9,113  11,195 
Germany 5,489  4,948  6,082 10,459  6,413 13,218 
Italy (a)  5,971 7,390  7,657  7,971 8,378    7,716 
Spain 4,617  4,965  6,701 8,363  9,582 
United Kingdom  7,924  5,941  7,090  11,484 
United States  7,896  8,805 9,490  10,468  22,476 
EU19 average  4,896 5,788  7,215  7,694 10,191 
OECD average  4,741 5,832  6,909  7,884 11,100 
OECD total  5,117 5,331  7,163  14,027 
 
(a): for Italy, public institutions only. 
Source: OECD, 2007a: table B1.1a. 
 
3. Educational attainment of adult population: only 50% of the age group 25-64 
has attained at least upper secondary education (table 3). Italy is catching up, but 




                                                 
1   OECD (2007a: 185) highlights that some countries do not determine a student’s intensity 
of participation by obtained credits, so that countries accurately accounting for part-time 
enrolment will have higher expenditure per full-time equivalent student than countries not 
differentiating between different modes of attendance. Notably, in Germany and Italy no 
distinction is made between part-time and full-time students at the university level. 5 
Table 3 
Population that has attained at least upper secondary education, by age group (% 2005)  
 
  25-64   25-34   35-44   45-54   55-64  
France   66  81  71  60  51 
Germany   83  84  85  84  79 
Italy   50  66  54  46  30 
Spain   49 64 54 41 26 
United Kingdom  67 73 67 65 60 
United States   88  87  88  89  86 
UE19 average  68  79  72  64  54 
OECD average   68  79  72  64  54 
 
Source: OECD, 2007a: table A1.2a. 
 
4. Quality of education: according to the 2006 PISA enquiry the performance of 
Italian students is well below the OECD average and superior only to Turkey and 
Mexico (figure 1). More worryingly, 33% of students do not reach the minimum 
level of mathematics proficiency (level 1 or below) and only 6% is at level 5 or 6. 
 
Figure 1 
Students at each proficiency level on the OECD PISA mathematics scale (% 2006) 
Source: OECD, 2007b: figure 6.19. 
 6 
5.  Geographical concentration of bad performance: most Italian educational 
problems are geographically concentrated in the South (figure 2) for various 
reasons: the lower efficiency of the schools, the backward economic and social 
context, and the negative influence of the average educational and cultural 
background of families in this part of the country (Cipollone-Visco, 2007; Italian 
Government, 2007: 89). As a matter of fact, Northern regions rank at the top of 
the PISA scores worldwide (Bratti-Checchi-Filippin, 2007: 4-6). 
 
Figure 2  


























Note: simple average of the regions joining the PISA research, namely Trentino A.A., Veneto 
and Friuli V.G. (North-East); Lombardia, Piemonte, Liguria and Emilia R. (North-West); Puglia, 
Basilicata and Campania (South); Sicilia and Sardegna (Islands). 
Source: elaborations on OECD, 2007b: tables S2c-S6c-S6e. 
 
6. Equity problems are relevant: young people with less than upper-secondary 
education are less likely to be in employment and the decrease of unemployment 
rates has been slower for them; moreover, they bear a high earnings penalty, and 
expect to spend a few hours in non-formal job-related training. Failing to meet 
baseline qualifications comes at increasingly high costs (OECD, 2007c). 
 
These issues reflect structural problems of the Italian educational system 
(lagged industrialisation and then reduced level of mass education; low 
participation ratios and high drop-out rates) rather than contingent ones. They are 7 
hardly the product of the numerous reforms that have been undertaken in the last 3 
or 4 decades, according to some experts (Checchi, 2003: 16-17). However, i) 
these reforms have not been able to reverse the trend, ii) in some cases at least (as 
for the reform of the primary school with the substitution of the single teacher 
with multiple teachers and the reforms of the higher secondary school which have 
simply reduced the requirements needed) reforms have created problems of 
efficiency and aggravated those of equity. 
 
 
2. The relative importance of public and private components 
  The private share of the Italian educational system is apparently rather 
limited, narrower than for other large EU countries and the OECD average, with 
only 4% of private sources, included subsidies, in primary and secondary 
education (table 4). However, as regards tertiary education, Italy is among the 
countries with the highest values and increases in the private contribution to the 
funding; the relative share of private expenditure rose from 17% to 31% between 
1995 and 2004.  
 
Table 4 
Share of private expenditure on educational institutions, by level of education (% 2004) 
 
 Pre-primary  Primary  and  secondary  Tertiary 
France   4,2 7,3  16,1 
Germany   28,2 18,1 13,6 
Italy   9,2 3,9  30,6 
Spain   17,5 7,5  24,1 
United Kingdom  5,1 13,4 30,4 
United States   24,6 8,7  64,6 
EU19 average  12,1 6,3  16,0 
OECD average   20,0 8,3  24,3 
 
Source: OECD, 2007a: table B3.2a-b. 
 
However, this assertion needs some qualifications in relation to the following 
issues. 
1. The limited importance of the private component is measured in terms of the 
source of funds, not their use (or the amount of education services provided). 8 
Some private schools and Universities are really funded by the Italian 
government. 
The relevance of direct public expenditure on private institutions and indirect 
public transfers and payments to the private sector is rather limited for all levels of 
non tertiary education (less than 3% in 2004 in Italy, much lower than other major 
EU countries and the OECD average), but is much more significant for tertiary 
education (as high as 19%, i.e. at a level comparable to that of Germany, but still 
less than the OECD average) (table 5). 
 
Table 5 
Distribution of total public expenditure on education, by level of education (% 2004) 
 
























France 84,0  12,6  3,4 86,7 5,4 7,9 
Germany 84,0  11,1  4,9 80,9 1,2  17,9 
Italy  97,0 1,3  1,6  81,1 2,2  16,7 
Spain 84,1  14,5  1,5 90,2 1,9 7,8 
United Kingdom  78,9  19,1 2,0  -  76,1  23,9 
United States  99,8  0,2 -  71,1  8,2  20,7 
EU19 average  86,7  9,8 4,0 74,9  10,6  15,1 
OECD average  88,4  8,7 3,6 73,7 8,0  18,4 
 
Source: OECD, 2007a: table B4.2 
 
The case of private funding of educational services provided by public 
institutions takes place only to a limited extent, in so far as households are asked 
to pay fees for the provision of education by public institutions. As fees are a very 
small percentage of the cost of educational services, and donations play a very 
limited role, we can conclude that the reported statistics overestimate the role of 
public bodies in the provision of educational services in Italy. In fact, data show a 
higher proportion of the private tertiary education in terms of number of students 
enrolled, even if the percentage is again lower than in other EU countries and for 





Number of students enrolled and schools in Italy, by management (scholastic year 2005/06) 
 
  Total  State public sector  Non-state 





Students   Pre-primary   1,674,095   979,301  58,5  196,721  11,8  462,964   27,7   35,109  2.1 
  Primary 2,796,447   2,545,491  91,0  60,629  2,2  181,770   6,5   8,557  0.3 
  Lower secondary   1,767,506   1,668,184  94,4  33,506  1,9  65,450   3,7   366  0.0 
  Upper secondary   2,703,309   2,521,581  93,3  51,633  1,9  126,268   4,7   3,827  0.1 
  Total  8,941,357   7,714,557  86,3  342,489  3,8  836,452   9,4   47,859  0.5 
Schools  Pre-primary   24,878  13,614  54,7  2,870  11,5  7,216   29,0   1,178  4.7 
  Primary 18,444  16,199  87,8  674  3,7  1,422   7,7   149  0.8 
  Lower secondary   7,954   7,102  89,3  177  2,2  667   8,4   8  0.1 
  Upper secondary   6,833   5,039  73,7  189  2,8  1,512   22,1   93  1.4 
  Total  58,109  41,954  72,2  3,910  6,7  10,817   18,6   1,428  2.5 
 
(a): schools owned by Regions, Provinces or Municipalities. 
Source: Italian Government [2007: table 1.4, p. 34]. 
 
Table 7 
Students enrolled in private institutions, by level (% 2005) 
 








France   15.3 21.3 30.2 28.1  12.7 
Germany   3.1 7.6 8.3  35.8  3.7 
Italy   6.9 3.6 5.4  15.2  6.3 
Spain   31.7 32.0 21.6 21.6  12.0 
United Kingdom  5.3 6.8  75.0  100.0  100.0 
United States   10.3 8.7 8.6  15.2  27.4 
UE19 average  10.3 12.7 18.3 27.8  18.3 
OECD average   9.2 12.1 18.7 32.4  21.9 
 
Note: both Government-dependent and independent private institutions. 
Source: OECD, 2007a: tables C2.6 and C2.9. 
 
2. The relatively small percentage of private sources has no uniform distribution 
across the different educational levels. Private funds and schools are, in fact, more 
important at the pre-primary, primary and tertiary levels, thus taking the crucial 
segments of the educational system (primary: 7% of students; lower secondary: 
4%; upper secondary: 5%; tertiary-type B: 15%; tertiary-type A: 6%) (table 7). 
 
3. As for the quality standards of educational services, the role of public bodies is 
still predominant in Italy. At least for education from the primary to the tertiary 
level, ex ante quality standards of educational programs
2 are set by the central 
                                                 
2  These take the form of number and contents of disciplines to be taught, number of total 
days of teaching, terms of final examinations, etc. 10 
government (Checchi-Jappelli, 2007). Private schools must comply with them, if 
the educational title they grant is to be put on the same footing as that granted by 
public schools, when such a title is required to access a job. Private schools 
complying with publicly-set standards are named ‘paritarie’ (certified private 
schools). The level of the standards set by the government has deteriorated in the 
last years, but is still in the hands of the central government, as the principle of 
public recognition of educational titles is still in force
3. A debate is currently 
taking place as to the possibility of abandoning the principle of public recognition 
of titles (while maintaining uniformity of ex ante standards) in order to enhance 
competition between different schools and universities and let the families and 
students choose among them. 
 
 
3. The private provision of educational services 
As already said, there are indications that the private provision is most 
important for the first and the top levels of education. 
In fact, there are a multitude of private pre-primary and primary schools, and 
private tertiary universities, since a long time. The number of the latter has 
increased in the last few years. Most private education is provided by Catholic 
schools, but other non-profit and for-profit organisations are also present, and the 
proprietary structure and role matter for efficiency and quality (Barbetta-Turati, 
2003)
4. Differently from the US confessional schools, mainly aiming at increasing 
opportunities for disadvantaged students, most Italian private schools – Catholic 
or for-profit – have a remedial role for lazy but rich or medium-class students, 
with a few notable exceptions of top-level institutions traditionally aimed to select 
future elites (Bertola-Checchi, 2004; Di Pietro-Cutillo, 2006).  
The importance of private institutions in the bottom and top levels of education 
is largely explained by the tendency of the Italian Catholic institutions to spread 
their religion especially among the children, on the one hand, and the future ruling 
                                                 
3  Public bodies and professional orders (lawyers, medical doctors, etc.) must accept the 
education titles granted by different schools or universities for the same level, irrespectively of the 
body granting the titles. 
4  Bocconi University and LUISS ‘Guido Carli’ University are the most notable examples of 
top level private institutions in tertiary education. Formally, they are non-profit organisations. 11 
class, on the other. Similar motivations explain the presence of the LUISS ‘Guido 
Carli’ University, instituted by Confindustria, the Association of Italian 
manufacturers. 
At all levels the private provision of education has been given an incentive in 
the last decades through the voucher system. 
 
 
4. The voucher system  
There are two sources of finance for vouchers in Italy: the central government 
and regional governments, since the year 2000, when a law was passed with the 
aim to ensure equality of opportunities and freedom to choose among different 
schools. The amount of government vouchers, 30 million €, is divided among all 
the students attending a certified private school, with an average amount of some 
200€ per student. The low per capita amount of this source of vouchers makes its 
impact on families’ choices a little more than symbolic (Checchi-Jappelli, 2003). 
The amount of regional vouchers is instead significant. Not all regions have 
introduced such vouchers (only 8 out of a total of 20 have done so), and there is a 
profound difference between two different targets pursued by the regions and the 
implementation systems they have adopted (Brunello-Checchi, 2005). 
A majority of regions (usually led by right-wing governments) grants vouchers 
tied to the income of families and not to the students’ performance. In theory this 
type of vouchers is designed in such a way as to back students coming from low 
or middle-class families, but in practice they tend to favour tax evaders and 
students who have already decided to attend private schools
5. Their amount, while 
covering only a percentage of the total costs, is rather high as compared to the 
amount of the central government’s vouchers. They could have a non-negligible 
impact on students’ choices, were not for some inefficiency in their 
implementation
6. In one region at least, some research shows the ineffectiveness 
of vouchers in increasing private schools enrolment (Conti-Sette, 2005). 
                                                 
5   Income ceilings are not very low (between 30,000 and 53,800 €), and refund is possible 
only for enrolment and tuition fees, not for general maintenance of students and support of the 
families. 
6  This is due to the ex post payment of vouchers, the uncertainty as to the amount, the 
length of the payment and other features. 12 
Two regions, Emilia-Romagna and Toscana , led by left-wing governments, 
have introduced vouchers based on a fixed payment, aimed only to support low-
income families (the income ceiling of recipients is 20,000 €) and good performer 
students, and designed in such a way as to finance both private and public school 
attendance and not to cover only tuition fees. However, the amount of these 
vouchers is fairly low and they have neither influence on the students’ choices nor 
significant economic effects. 
The economic effects of the first kind of regional vouchers may be different 
according to a number of features of demand and supply (Belfield-Levin, 2002: 
66-70). In Italy there has been a shift in the (private) supply that has reduced the 
net price paid for school services, thus attributing most of the voucher benefits 
(83%) to the households (Brunello-Checchi, 2005: 32). Demand has increased 
only for marginal families, since vouchers cover less than half of the tuition fees 
(Brunello-Checchi, 2005: 11-13). Had demand significantly increased, the 
vouchers might have been appropriated by private education providers, which is 
contrary to the Italian Constitution, which forbids public funding of private 
schools, a regulation which, however, has not been consistently applied in other 
circumstances. 
To the extent to which there is no efficiency gain for the educational system, 
vouchers not designed to increase the choice set available to households “could 
only produce redistribution of income away from the taxpayer to the wealthy 
households who enrol their offspring in private schools” (Brunello-Checchi, 2005: 
33). At the same time, low-income students could remain in a low-opportunities 
and low-quality school trap (Checchi, 1999: 217-222). 
It is indeed difficult to assess whether the Italian-style voucher systems 
increase efficiency, because these have been active for a few years only.  
Empirical evidence is not conclusive in the US too. In the US the efficiency 
seems to be limited in any case, as there has been a greater differentiation among 
schools not implying better average quality (Ladd, 2002; Mitch, 2004: 272-276). 
Moreover, constraints to join the voucher programs (such as the existence of a 
ceiling to fees, compliance with public standards set by the state, no 13 
discrimination among students) let almost only confessional schools to be 
included in the programs. 
International experiences on vouchers, whether used for education or different 
ends, shows that positive results in terms of costs and quality can be obtained only 
when some basic conditions are satisfied, such as the existence of a plurality of 
agents, simplified choices to be made (for the irrelevance of transaction costs, 
asymmetric information), repetition of choices and absence of externalities 
(Beltrametti 2004: 59-67). As such conditions are difficult to be met in practice, 
there are uncertain and limited benefits to draw from vouchers in terms of 
efficiency. It is then advisable to design voucher programs to increasing the 
opportunities and welfare of a subset of students, worthy but not wealthy (Ladd, 
2002: 18-21; Epple-Romano, 2002: 30-31). Consistently with this conclusion, 
means-tested tight-scale redistributive programs, limited to low-income families – 
as in the spirit of the 2000 Italian law on the school system – could comply with 
the Italian Constitution
7, and increase the choice set available to households 
(Pomini-Rangone, 2004: 177).  
 
 
5. The features of the Italian private system of education.  
Italian private schools are characterised by three main features. First, the 
likelihood of enrolment is positively correlated with the father’s education level, 
family’s income and expectations, and (in primary and lower secondary schools) 
the absence of a housewife mother (Checchi-Jappelli, 2007). 
Second, the quality of teaching is not better than in the public sector, as shown 
by a higher participation to remedial activities, a lower quantity of homework (i.e. 
lower effort required), the students’ age (i.e. more students who have been held 
back by repetitions)
8, PISA scores controlled by parental education and socio-
economic status (Brunello-Checchi, 2005: 6-8). Also university outcomes are 
better for the public sector students, while private schools allow to improve the 
                                                 
7   Which, as we have said, forbids the public funding of private schools. 
8  But primary education, because private schools allow to gather early starters in order to 
shorten the educational career of the kids. 14 
performance only for a subset of students, coming from best family backgrounds 
(Bertola-Checchi, 2004). 
PISA figures show that students’ science scores in private schools – both 
government-dependent and independent institutions – rank above public schools 
only in Piedmont and Alto Adige (table 8). Moreover, when controlling for 
economic, social and cultural status of students and schools, public schools scores 
are much higher than private schools in every region, so that the difference 
between them ranges from 31 points in Alto Adige to 124 in Friuli (table 9). 
 
Table 8 
Italian students’ performance on the OECD PISA scores, 
by region and type of school (2006) 
 
Performance of public school students  Performance of private school students  Region 
% of 
students 
Science Reading Math  % of 
students
Science Reading   Math 
Alto Adige  96,6  526 502 513 3,4 537 515 529 
Friuli V.G.  96,8  535 518 513 3,2 496 534 497 
Liguria  91,5  495 490 478 8,5 422 429 430 
Lombardia  92,8  505 495 491 7,2 461 466 459 
Piemonte  89,2  507 504 491 10,8 515 517 502 
Trentino  84,7  537 528 523 15,3 431 400 423 
Veneto  91,2  531 519 517 8,8 467 454 454 
 
Source: elaborations on OECD, 2007b: table S5b. 
 
Table 9 
Differences of performance on the OECD PISA scores 
between public and private schools in Italian regions (2006) 
 
PISA index of economic, social and 
cultural status 
Difference in performance 
after accounting for the PISA 
index of economic, social and 
cultural status of: 










Difference students students  and 
schools 
Alto Adige  -8  -0,10 0,32 -0,42 -4  31 
Friuli V.G.  39  0,05 1,12 -1,07 67  124 
Liguria 82 0,13 0,61 -0,48 94  114 
Lombardia 57  -0,13 -0,04 -0,08 59  64 
Piemonte -8  0,01 0,79 -0,78 18  65 
Trentino 106  0,04 -0,49 0,53 93  59 
Veneto 64  0,00 0,04 -0,04 65 68 
 
Source: elaborations on OECD, 2007b: table S5b. 
 
Third, tuition fees represent the price for the lower effort to get the diploma, 
the access to informal networks (which is very important in the Italian labour 15 
market), the homogeneous cultural or confessional culture, the additional facilities 
and services provided (Checchi-Jappelli, 2007). 
While the average class size in Italy appears to be very close in both public and 
private institutions, the ratio of students to teaching staff is sharply lower in 
private schools than in public ones, differently from other major OECD countries, 
the United Kingdom excluded (table 10). 
 
Table 10 
Average class size and ratio of students to teaching staff, 
by level and type of school (2005) 
 
  Average class size  Ratio of students to teaching staff 






















France   n.a.   n.a.   23,4   24,8   13,9   15,5   9,6   12,5  
Germany   22,0   23,1   24,7   25,8   15,8   13,0   14,2   12,8  
Italy   18,3   19,1   20,9   21,4   10,3   7,3   11,9   4,4  
Spain   19,4   24,2   23,8   26,7   11,2   16,2   7,4   11,5  
United Kingdom  25,8   10,7   24,3   9,7   18,6   7,2   12,5   7,8  
United States   23,6   19,4   24,9   19,3   15,7   10,7   16,5   12,2  
UE19 average  21,7   20,1   23,8   22,7   13,8   12,7   13,2   12,0  
OECD average   20,3   18,9   22,5   21,6   11,9   11,4   11,9   11,4  
 
Source: OECD, 2007a: tables D2.1-2.3. 
 
As Brunello and Rocco (2004: 24) point out, “…private schools can offer 
alternatives to quality in exchange for a positive price. The empirical evidence 
from Italy suggests that they offer leisure”. Besides leisure, they also offer 
services not provided by public schools: early start of compulsory education, full-
day school, integrative activities, labs, etc. Notably, full-day school could 
represent a substitute for welfare state services and/or family care of children 
when there is no presence of a housewife mother. 
These features of the private sector are framed into the Italian society, 
characterised by the generational persistence of inequalities, and the wide role of 
familistic and informal networks in the labour market. To a large extent, education 
levels and opportunities depend not on primary (innate capabilities, personal 
effort), but on secondary factors (social context, family economic and cultural 
resources of the family, school quality) (Checchi, 1999: 109-161; Ballarino-
Checchi, 2006; Checchi, 2006). 16 
Intergenerational mobility is low, notwithstanding a very low cost of public 
education and the equal opportunities that are guaranteed by low access costs to it. 
Indeed, there is empirical evidence of self-selection in education tracks and the 
path to the university, due to the segmentation of upper secondary schools, 
according not only to the capabilities of the students, but also to their parents’ 
income and cultural level (Checchi-Zollino, 2001; Brunello-Checchi, 2006; 
Checchi-Flabbi, 2006). 
Social stratification occurs through the schooling process and the family 
behaviour: “Educated parents provide a more stimulating cultural environment 
for their children, and help them in their homework. At the end of compulsory 
education (at the age of 13) their children obtain positive evaluations and are 
advised to proceed further in academic oriented secondary schools. At the 
opposite side, children from uneducated parents are more likely repeating some 
year, ending compulsory school with low evaluations and following their 
teachers’ advice to enrol vocational or technical schools. Early tracking 
determines future destinies of children: high schools are characterised by less 
repetitions, almost total absence of track changes and high transition rates to 
university; at the opposite extreme, vocational schools are populated by students 
unconvinced of their curricula, with repeated failed years, and they exit with low 
intention to go on with tertiary education” (Checchi,  2003: 24-25). 
 
 
6. Can increased competition between private and public schools lead to a 
better system? 
Privatization policies – most notably the system of vouchers – should be 
evaluated according to criteria relating to productive efficiency, equality and 
social cohesion, freedom of choice (Belfield-Levin, 2002: 35-52). 
From the point of view of efficiency, in Italy there are a number of reasons 
why greater competition between the public and the private sector could not 
enhance the school performance (Beltrametti, 2004: 87-113)
9. First, the conditions 
                                                 
9    Consider, however, that the mission of public schools according to the Italian 
Constitution is not simply that of enhancing human capital, but to implement the right of citizens 
to education.  17 
for the good performance of the few private schools and universities of prestige 
existing in Italy are difficult to replicate, at least in the medium run. In addition, 
the “exit” mechanism underlying the competition has its shortcomings, as it 
reduces the interest and participation of politicians and families in the life and 
performance of educational institutions (“voice”). Thirdly, the exit of some 
students from public schools can contribute to the reduction of an enriching 
variety of experiences, capacities and positions. Fourthly, abandonment or 
weakening of the common standards set by the government could also increase 
asymmetric information, thus reducing efficiency. Finally, because of the 
existence of fixed costs, the efficiency of the public school system might not 
improve and could indeed deteriorate. 
Actually, a significant correlation appears between high outcomes and some 
financial and economic factors: endowment and maintenance of school structures, 
availability of labs and integrative activities, motivation of the actors in the 
education system, higher level of education of the parents, probability of 
unemployment of the family location as an incentive to spend effort (Bratti-
Checchi-Filippin, 2007: 8-16). 
From the point of view of equity and social cohesion, the possible polarisation 
of students could lead to the formation of ghettoes, a deeper social stratification, a 
reduction in tolerance and integration as well as intergenerational mobility, a rise 
in ideological fundamentalism. 
From the point of view of freedom of choice, there is no empirical evidence 
that families modify their educational choices when vouchers are of a limited 
amount, i.e. not entirely covering tuition fees and general maintenance of 
students, are offered. A quasi-market scheme where the government retains a 
significant role in setting standards and ensuring dissemination of the relevant 
information while financing privately-provided educational services through a 
system of vouchers of a sizeable amount, would certainly entail losses in some 
kind of freedom (i.e., the parental freedom to choose the best schools for their 
children), but would also ensure gains in some other kind of freedom (i.e., the 
freedom for future citizen for which the possibility of socializing and deciding in 
autonomy is important) (Granaglia, 2007) 18 
7. Concluding remarks 
Bad-designed vouchers and low-quality private sector fail to increase either 
efficiency or opportunities, if factors causing self-selection of scholastic tracks 
and intergenerational persistence of inequalities are not removed. On the contrary, 
inequalities rise, as low-income students enrol in public schools endowed with 
low resources (Checchi-Zollino, 2001: 19-21; Checchi, 1999: 217-222). 
General-purposes voucher systems, as in the Italian experimentations, are 
poorly effective. They fail to remove constraints to family choices, because they 
are not aimed at specific targets or subset of students whose educational tracks 
should be supported for efficiency or equity reasons. 
The current debate on vouchers could shift political focus from structural and 
resource problems to the freedom of choice. The latter is an important element of 
social wellbeing and equal opportunities, but it results only as an ideological 
objective if structural issues are not tackled. Notably, it appears rather paradoxical 
that in the Northern regions, where incomes are higher and there are no efficiency 
issues of public schools, the support for vouchers is wider; while in the South, 
whose PISA scores are at the bottom of the OECD ranking (with very critical 
peaks), vouchers are not implemented, except in the right-wing led Sicily. 
All this conceals financial and economic factors influencing students’ 
outcomes and territorial disparities indeed. Notably, a suitable socio-cultural 
environment appears to be an important issue, to the extent that, especially in the 
South, high unemployment rates make the study effort not worthy to undertake, in 
order to find a better job and to earn higher incomes. In such a situation, the youth 
choose alternative paths, e.g. working in the irregular (even crime) sector, 
perceived as more rewarding than investing in their human capital: “A policy 
simultaneously targeting schools, families and the local socio-economic 
environment might be much more effective in reducing territorial disparities” 
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